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Too many presidents ‘spoil the broth’ ? 
– what role for the European Commission in  
global climate change politics?  
ABSTRACT 
The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both 
implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the 
international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. Although the 
competence for action in climate change is shared between the national 
governments and the supranational level of the European Union, on behalf of 
the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international 
climate change negotiations. The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) 
brought a number of changes to the institutional framework of the European 
Union, most significantly to the European Council and the external role of the 
EU. These changes appear to have added to the complexity which surrounds 
issues of the external representation of the EU and not simplified them – are 
there too many ‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? This paper 
questions the extent to which these changes will impact on the Commission 
headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), 
particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate 
change policy and hence direction to the approach which the EU takes in global 
climate change politics.  
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Introduction  
 
The European Union is the only supranational organisation to have both 
implemented ‘domestic’ climate change policy and provided leadership for the 
international community on adaptation and mitigation measures. The 
competence for action in climate change is shared between the national 
governments and the supranational level of the European Union. 1
 
 On behalf of 
the EU the European Commission has played a prominent role in international 
climate change negotiations, acting on an agreed mandate from the national 
governments in the negotiations. Although the approach adopted by the EU in 
global climate change is the responsibility of the European Council/Council of 
Ministers the EU’s domestic policy is the outcome of the deliberations and 
negotiations between the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council of Ministers. It is this domestic policy which is then used by EU’s 
Member States to fulfil its commitments in global agreements. The leadership 
which the President of the Commission gives to the Commission in the 
development of climate change policy is of importance to overall position 
which the Member States of EU are able to achieve in international climate 
change politics. 
Agreement amongst the EU’s Member States had been difficult to achieve prior 
to the opening of the UN Copenhagen Summit negotiations. A combination of 
more active support from Barroso for the ideas of the Environment 
Commissioner Stavros Dimas, a conjunction of energy concerns with the 
climate change agenda and Barroso’s ability to reach consensus between the 
Member States enabled the EU to put forward an offer to cut emissions. 
However it was evident that the EU was unable to influence the outcomes of the 
UN Copenhagen Summit in 2009.  Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberal group in 
the European Parliament commenting that “ Copenhagen may well have had a 
different outcome had Europe been represented by a single person, instead of 
eight (the Danes who organised the summit, Barroso and the Commission 
representation, Reinfelt, representing the incumbent Swedish EU presidency, 
Zapatero, representing the future Spanish presidency, Ashton, the HRCFSP, 
Brown, UK Prime Minister, Sarkozy, French President and Merkel, German 
Chancellor. (EURACTIV, 2010:9) The consequence was that the EU was 
unable to secure support for its proposed unconditional 20% reduction target for 
carbon emissions with a conditional 30% also being offered. Nevertheless 
within the EU the arena of climate change action was considered to be one of 
the more successful aspects of the Commission under the leadership of 
President Jose Manuel Barroso particularly between 2007-2009 (Barroso I 
                                                          
1 Shared competence means that the Member States have the powers to legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
in so far as the Union has not exercised nor decided to stop exercising its competences.  
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Commission 2004-2009).  This paper considers the leadership on climate 
change which is being given by Barroso as re-elected President to the 
Commission  (Barroso II, 2010-2014).  
 
The Lisbon Treaty (in force December 2009) brought a number of changes to 
the institutional framework of the European Union, most significantly to the 
European Council and the external role of the EU. These changes appear to 
have added to the complexity which surrounds issues of the external 
representation of the EU and not simplified them – are there too many 
‘Presidents’ of these institutions vying for a role? The paper questions the extent 
to which these changes will impact on the Barroso II Commission (2009-2014), 
particularly on Barroso’s ability to provide leadership on ‘domestic’ climate 
change policy and hence influence and provide political direction to the 
approach which the EU takes in global climate change politics.  
 
This paper begins by analysing the leadership style given to the Commission by 
President Barroso during his first Presidency (2004-2009) before considering 
the changes to the institutions particularly to the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers as a result of the Lisbon Treaty.  The short period of time 
since the Lisbon Treaty came into force is acknowledged in this paper but it is 
argued that the potential for undermining what had been an evolving coherence 
in the approach of the EU to global climate change politics is already apparent. 
If the EU is to regain its position as a leader of global climate change action 
then there a number of complex issues which must be addressed and managed 
in order to ensure the coherence needed to give effectiveness to the EU’s action 
in the global climate change debates.  
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Barroso and climate change policy 2004-2009 
 
Within the European Union (EU) the climate change policy agenda both drives 
and is driven by the ambition of the EU to demonstrate its global leadership in 
those international agreements which have been negotiated under the auspices 
of the United Nations. 2
The role of the Commission, as outlined in the founding Treaties of the 1950s, 
was to be that of a small-scale de-politicized functionalist bureaucracy charged 
with taking the integration agenda forward. Decisions about policy and 
measures were to be taken within the College of Commissioners. (c.f. Box 1. 
Powers of the Commission, after Coombs.)  
 Internal climate change policy and the approach 
adopted by the EU in global climate change politics are inextricably linked. As 
a leader dependent on soft power the ability to demonstrate that transnational 
action on climate change is possible is the primary weapon of the EU. 
Environmental policy which included climate change policy during Barroso I 
Commission was an area of shared competence between the supranational level 
of the European Community and the national governments. The Commission is 
responsible for the initiation of internal climate change policy and as a 
consequence has much potential to determine the direction of the approach 
which the EU will adopt and has adopted in global developments. Despite some 
criticisms of the Barroso I Commission’s overall performance on environmental 
protection the arena of climate change action was one of the more successful 
aspects of the period of his first Presidency (2004-2009), the climate and energy 
package being perhaps the Commission’s greatest uncontested success. 
(Kaczynski et al, 2009.) 
Box 1. Powers of the Commission, based on the analysis of Coombes 
((1970), cited in Spence (2006:7)) 
The powers of the Commission may be summarised as:- 
1. Agenda setting 
2. Formal right to initiate legislation 
3. Consensus-building between the national governments, the EP and other 
interested parties and stake-holders  
4. Management of Commission programmes 
5. Representation of the EU in external (economic) relations 
6. Provides oversight and enforcement of European law  
7. Representation of the general interest of the EU. 
                                                          
2 The adoption of the United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992) , the 
Protocol signed in Kyoto in December 19972 and the preparations for successor to the Kyoto Protocol which 
was due to be adopted at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009. 
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However as a consequence of changes to the Treaties, successive phases of EU 
enlargement and increased responsibilities as the process of integration amongst 
the Member States has progressed different patterns of policy and decision-
making have come to characterise differing policy areas. Whilst the 
Commission continues as a bureaucracy it has become a more politicized 
bureaucracy which is required to respond to an increasing number of challenges 
(Peterson and Birdsall, 2008). Since the Santer Commission (1994-1999) and 
the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty (in force 1999) the powers conferred on 
the Commission President have altered. The President of the Commission 
provides the political orientation for the Commission. Decision-making within 
the College of Commissioners is on the basis of a simple majority of its 
members, including the President. The principle of the Commission President as 
primus inter pares within the College of Commissioners remains but the 
practice has become somewhat different. The Lisbon Treaty has further 
distanced the President from the rest of the College of Commissioners. 
At the same time, and as a consequence of the national concerns about the role 
of the Commission, the Commission’s power in relation to the other institutions, 
particularly to the European Parliament (EP), appears to have diminished. As a 
result Hayward (2008) concluded that the Commission had ‘retreated’ from that 
aspect of the institution’s role of the as path-finder for ever-closer integration 
and more emphasis has been placed on that of consensus mediator and manager 
of specific projects. This analysis seemingly undervalues the evolution of the 
role of the Commission overall and the Commission President in particular in 
the enlarged EU 27. It appears to suggest that the Commission and its President 
will no longer act as a promoter of integrative action, providing direction and 
hence leadership within the EU. But it that the case? The evidence suggests that 
the answer is highly nuanced and complex. 
Box 2. Factors affecting the capacity of the Commission President to exert 
political influence/leadership on the climate change policy agenda include 
the:- 
 
 
• Powers conferred in the Treaties of the EU on the Commission and the 
President of the Commission. 
• Acceptance of role for the Commission by the international community. 
• Style of leadership of the Commission President. 
• Level of cohesion which may be achieved between the Commissioners 
with responsibility for the relevant portfolios.  
• Element of ‘capture’ of the leadership role in global climate change 
politics by the European Council/Council of Ministers. 
• Impact of changes to the powers and role of the European Parliament.  
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• Response of the Commission to the changing nature of the EU as a result 
of enlargement.  
• Dynamics of the relationship between the Commission and the 
stakeholders in the multi-levelled governance of the EU. 
• Context of the proposals including the adoption of the concept of 
ecological modernisation as part of the belief system underpinning policy 
proposals. 
 
 
The competences which have been conferred on the Commission and its 
President in the Treaties determine the overall parameters within which the 
institution operates. The effectiveness of the contribution made by the 
Commission relies on the way in which these competences are exercised, 
particularly the formal right of initiation of policy. If this formal right, 
‘jealously guarded’ by the Commission, is not exercised then no policy 
proposals will be forthcoming. In turn the agreements made by the national 
governments in the global negotiations become a pillar of the internal policy as 
the Commission seeks the measures to fulfil those agreement commitments.   
Barroso’s style of leadership was described variously as pragmatic or 
technocratic in the early period of his first Presidency, apparently consistent 
with Hayward’s conclusion of a retreat by the Commission from a proactive 
role in integration to that of managing specific projects. (Hayward 2008) 
Barroso appeared to favour incremental action, departing little from existing 
policies. He was initially criticised by environmental organisations for giving 
economic development priority and not promoting the objectives of climate 
change politics. A view which Barroso appeared to reinforce at the beginning of 
his first Presidency in 2005 when he commented, ‘Let me say this. It is as if I 
have three children – the economy, our social agenda, and the environment. 
Like any modern father – if one of my children is sick, I am ready to drop 
everything and focus on him until he is back to health. …But that does not mean 
I love the others any less! We must deliver jobs and growth…’ (thus seeming to 
ignore the environment and social agendas in favour of the economy).  (Barroso 
2005) 
 
The approach to leadership adopted by any individual is of its nature difficult to 
identify and within the EU constrained by the competences which have been 
assigned in the Treaties.  Hayward variously describes the leadership style of 
the Commission President as a more dynamic  heroic 3
                                                          
3 Heroic leadership - ‘...sets explicit long term objectives to be pursued by maximum co-ordination of public 
policies and by an ambitious assertion of political will...’ 
 style and a more 
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incremental and humdrum 4
 
 approach. (Hayward 2008:6/7). Cini (2008) has 
emphasised the difficulty of determining whether the approach to leadership of 
the EU adopted by Commission and its President is that of political influence or 
leadership, concluding that the answer is nuanced. In this paper it is argued that 
a ‘sea change’ in Barroso’s approach came in 2007 when the issue of energy 
security was linked with climate change and gained increased prominence on 
the political agendas of the national governments. From 2007 Barroso had more 
opportunity to exert political influence and arguably leadership on the decision-
making process. As President of the European Commission his style of 
leadership became more presidential  (Peterson and Birdsall, 2008, Missiroli, 
2009) as he was prepared to give much clearer direction to the domestic climate 
change policy agenda.  
In his analysis of the style of leadership of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Kille identifies  a number of personality characteristics associated with 
the different leadership styles, Amongst these he highlighted the importance of 
the individual’s belief in their ability to influence decisions (Kille, 2006:20) He 
linked this with activism on the part of those leaders he identified as visionaries 
or strategists, whilst those who have a low degree of belief in their ability to 
influence decisions he concluded are most likely to evidence a managerial style 
of leadership. (c.f Table 2). 
 
Kille’s analysis offers a nuanced model of the leadership which identifies a mid-
way position between a visionary heroic leader and a humdrum technocratic 
manager – ie a strategist. He highlights a number of characteristics which a 
strategist as leader would demonstrate, primarily concentrating on the belief the 
individual has that they are able to influence policy decisions, sensitivity to the 
context in which the decisions are made, desire to  maintain good relationships 
and a strong attachment to the supranational organisation (cf. Table 3).  For 
Barroso his belief in his opportunity to exert influence on the development of 
climate change policy came from a co-incidence of a number of issues. Climate 
change policy provided an issue arena with clearly identified objectives where 
the Commission President could provide that executive leadership described by 
Burns as indispensable and effective at accomplishing specific and limited goals 
(Burns 1978:396).  
                                                          
4 Humdrum leadership – this style does not ‘...have an explicit overriding long term objective and action is 
incremental, departing only slightly from existing policies as circumstances require’ 
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Table 1 Characteristics of leadership styles, after Kille. 
 
Characteristic  Managerial  Strategic Visionary 
    
Responsivity High High Low 
Belief that can 
influence 
Low High High 
Need for recognition Low Low High 
Need for relationships High High Low 
Supranationalism Low High High 
Problem-solving 
emphasis 
Low Medium High 
    
Source Kille (2006:20) 
 
Table 2 Personal characteristics, after Kille 
 
Characteristic Description 
  
Responsivity Sensitivity to context and analytical capability 
Belief that can 
influence 
Perceive self as capable of influencing events 
Need for recognition Unwilling to relinquish control and work behind the 
scenes without credit 
Need for 
relationships 
Desire to maintain good personal relationships 
Supranationalism  Strong attachment to and desire to defend the 
*European Union and the organization’s values 
Problem-solving 
emphasis 
Emphasize completing tasks over interpersonal 
concerns 
Source Kille (2006:17) * as applied to the European Union 
 
Table 3. Style of leadership demonstrated by Presidents of the Commission,  
post 1989. 
 
Date of 
Commission 
Commission 
President 
Style of 
Presidency, after 
Hayward 
Style of President, 
after Kille 
1985-1988 
Delors I 
Jacques Delors Heroic/Strategic 
Innovator 
Visionary 
1989-1992 
Delors II 
Jacques Delors Heroic/Strategic 
Innovator 
Visionary 
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1993-1995 
Delors III 
Jacques Delors Heroic/Strategic 
Innovator 
Visionary/Strategic 
1995-1999 Jacques Santer Humdrum Managerial 
1999 
(March to 
September) 
Manuel Marin 
 (caretaker  
President) 
Humdrum Managerial 
1999-2004 Romano Prodi Humdrum Managerial 
2004-2010 
Barroso I 
Jose Manuel 
Barroso 
Humdrum/Strategic 
Innovator 
Strategic 
Barroso as 
Caretaker 
2009 (1st Nov) 
– 2010 (9th 
February)  
Jose Manuel 
Barroso 
 
 
 
  
Barroso re-
elected for 
second term -   
Council decision 
July 9 2009, EP 
vote held in 
September 2009 
  
2010-2014 
Barroso II 
Jose Manuel 
Barroso 
 
Humdrum?????? Managerial??????? 
Source: Commission, various, Kille (2006), Hayward (2008) 
Barroso demonstrated characteristics of Kille’s strategic leader between 2007-
2009. In short he demonstrated more responsiveness to contextual factors, 
displaying greater recognition of his ability to influence decisions. Policy 
changes were dependent on Barroso’s ability to build relationships amongst the 
national leaders but these became easier as the prominence of energy security 
concerns were raised within the EU and linked to the climate change agenda. 
Increased activism was possible because of the coincidence of the factors which 
encouraged Barroso’s belief in his ability to provide greater political direction 
to the debate about climate change policy. His approach became less 
managerial, but it was not that of a visionary 
 
Barroso was not a ‘strategic innovator’, a style of leadership which Hayward 
considered to have characterised the Commission Presidencies of Jacques 
Delors. (Jacques Delors was considered by many to be the exemplar of a 
proactive leader of the European Commission.) Hayward’s conclusion is not 
unexpected as not only were the individuals, Delors and Barroso, different 
personalities whose views were determined by their political backgrounds and 
experiences, but the political environment and conditions which formed the 
context for the Barroso I Commission  were considerably different from those in 
which the Delors Commissions operated.  For Barroso the search was for 
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consensus in an enlarged EU of 27 member states. The number of national 
governments had increased since 2004/07 and at the same time the policy 
options which the Commission could propose and achieve that consensus had 
fallen. As Barroso commented in late 2008, following the adoption of the EU’s 
package of climate and energy measures, ‘...we would have preferred our initial 
proposals. But the suggestion that this is a watered down ambition is non-sense. 
We had to accept changes. That’s the price to pay for unity in the end and it’s a 
fair price’. (Grice 2008)  
 
It is argued in this paper that Barroso did not show evidence of political 
leadership on the climate change agenda. But as a result of a co-incidence of 
events in 2007-2009 he demonstrated increased belief in his ability to influence 
the EU’s approach to be adopted internally and hence form the basis of the EU’s 
stance in global climate change negotiations. Barroso did not however step 
outside nor try to ‘push the boundaries’ of the competences of the Commission 
presidency, but used them more effectively to influence the decisions of the 
national governments, particularly in the development of energy and climate 
change measures in 2007 and 2008.  5
 
  
Any political influence of the Commission will come from the effectiveness and 
acceptability of the internal policy proposals and the support from the national 
governments with which they are received. The competences conferred on the 
institution mean that role of the Commission is clearer in the development of 
the minutiae of agreements and policy instruments and not in terms of 
developing the broad strategic negotiating position of the EU that is the remit of 
the national governments. The national governments take the lead in global 
climate change politics but there is recognition both within the EU and the 
international community of the scientific expertise on which the Commission 
may rely and the input that the institution may make to the development of the 
range of instruments adopted by the international community.  
 
The legal framework for climate change action 
 
The Treaties of the 1950s did not contain any reference to action on climate 
change (it had not emerged on the political agendas of national governments at 
                                                          
5 In January 2008 a package of climate change and energy measures was proposed by the Commission to meet 
the EU’s targets (CEC 2008).  These proposals were approved in December 2009 for implementation from 
2011.  In addition to a non-legislative Communication (COM (2008) 30), the package of measures included:- 
 
1. Legislative proposals for the EU ETS (COM (2008) 16). 
2. Emission reductions outside the EU ETS (COM (2008) 17). 
3. Carbon capture and storage (COM 2008) 18. 
4. Renewable energy (COM (2008) 19). 
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the time). The basis for the EU’s climate change policy has developed from 
environmental policy, an arena of supranational action which was not included 
in the founding Treaties of the EU until the Single European Act of 1987. 
Nonetheless environmental policy is considered to be one of the more proactive 
areas of EU action. The first Treaty reference provided for shared competence 
for the Community to contribute to the conservation and improvement of the 
environment of the member states. The role for the Commission was subject to 
application of the principle of subsidiarity i.e. ‘…the EU takes measures only if 
and insofar that the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the member states and may be better achieved by the 
Community’...Article 5 TEC.  
 
In external climate change negotiations the member states and the Commission, 
representing the EU, are signatories and parties to international agreements on 
the basis of  TEC article 174 ex 130r (1) subset 4  - promoting measures at 
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems. 
TEC article 174 (4), ‘Within their respective spheres of competence the 
Community and the Member States shall co-operate with third countries and 
with the competent international organisations. The arrangements for 
Community co-operation may be the subject of agreements between the 
Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and 
concluded in accordance with article 300 (and) Article 300 TEC, Where this 
Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and 
one or more States or international organisation the Commission shall make 
recommendations to the Council which shall authorise the Commission to open 
the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations 
...within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue.’  
 
Despite these Treaty references and those introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1999) and the environmental activity of Commission there was no clear 
articulation of a legal framework for comprehensive EU action on climate 
change measures. The EU institutions could adopt environmental legislation on 
the basis of qualified majority vote apart from provisions which are primarily of 
a fiscal nature and measures significantly affecting choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. As the use of 
fossil fuels has been identified as the primary source of the greenhouse gas 
emissions which contribute to climate change this formed a considerable barrier 
to the development of an effective and holistic climate change policy for the 
EU. 
The Lisbon Treaty however included in Article 191 (1) ex 174 TEC subset 4 a 
commitment to ‘...promoting measures at international level to deal with 
regional or worldwide environmental problems and in particular combating 
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climate change ...’ But Article 192 Lisbon Treaty (2) para c ex 175 TEC  
continues the affirmation of the national competence for measures significantly 
affecting Member States choice between different energy resources and the 
general structure of energy supply – an indicator of the strength of support to 
protect national interests which continues amongst the Member States. It is also 
a protection which may prove difficult to work with in the development of 
future energy policy designed to be competitive, sustainable and improve 
security of supply. 
The competence for the Commission, as a non-state actor, to be a signatory of 
the UNFCCC (1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (1997) was established on the 
basis of Article 24(2) UNFCCC which contains the provision that regional 
economic integration organisations may become parties to the Convention 
jointly with their member states as long as those states are already parties (a 
‘mixed’ agreement under EU law). The member states and the organisation are 
required to identify their respective responsibilities and are not entitled to 
exercise concurrent responsibilities.  The role of the Commission as a signatory 
to the UNFCCC is not to assume the leadership on behalf of the EU – that 
remains with the Council of Ministers/ European Council, but rather to exercise 
its competences to provide support and complementary actions. 6
 
 
Table 4 Competence for action in selected  international environmental 
organisations and conventions, post Lisbon Treaty.  
 
International Environmental 
Organisations/Conventions 
Status of European Union (EU)  and Member 
States  
  
United Nations (UN) 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
European Union and Member States as members 
Kyoto Protocol European Union and Member States as members 
UN Environmental 
 Programme 
EU Observer Status, 
Some Member States 
UN Conference on Environment and Development EU and Member States as full participants 
UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) EU and Member States as members 
International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea EU and Member States as members 
International Seabed Authority EU and Member States as members 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North 
Atlantic 
EU and 12 Member States as members 
Protection of the Danube River EU and 6 Member States as members 
Adapted from Emerson and Kaczynski (2010:4) 
 
                                                          
6 Other groupings of states have emerged in the debates about global climate change politics (e.gs. the AOSIS - 
Alliance of Small Island States,  JUSSCANNZ -  comprising Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia, Norway, New Zealand, CARICOM - the Caribbean Community, the Alliance of African states). 
These groups do not have the legal status of regional economic organisations and so are not signatories to the 
UNFCCC. Their membership is not stable across phases of negotiations. As a result they are not able to present 
the collective position of a stable transnational group with its own legal and constitutional frameworks in place 
to support that position. 
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Within the EU competences are shared between the supranational Union and the 
Member States for environmental policy and since the Lisbon Treaty shared 
competence has also been conferred on climate change policy in a new article. 
On shared competence “The Union shall share competence with the Member 
States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the 
areas (of exclusive competence and supporting competence) ...” Article 4 
TFEU. Further explanation of what this means was set out in a Protocol to the 
Lisbon Treaty on the exercise of shared competence. 7
 
 On climate change policy 
the commitment of the EU in the chapter on the environment is to promoting 
measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change.  
Table 5 Role of EU institutions in climate change negotiations (internal and 
international) pre-Lisbon 
 
Institution Role in international climate change 
talks 
Personnel involved 
Domestic Climate change policy, 
exported to international level 
  
Commission  Initiation and monitoring domestic 
climate change measures. 
 
Facilitating consensus amongst 
national governments on climate 
change measures  
Environment Commissioner, 
Stavros Dimas (04/09) 
 
Commission  President,  Jose 
Manuel Barroso (04/09) 
Council of Ministers 
 
European Parliament 
Co-decision on domestic climate 
change action, introduction of 
transnational climate change measures 
 
International negotiations - 
preparations 
  
Council of Ministers  Mandate for international negotiations 
managed within the Council 
 
COREPER 1, 
Environment Council 
Working parties prepare draft 
proposals 
 
European Council  Complex issues referred for final 
decision (eg Copenhagen, 2009 
negotiations) 
 
International negotiations  –  
Copenhagen Summit, 2009 
  
EU represented in 2009 Copenhagen 
summit by  
 
 
 
 
‘troika’ consisting of:- 
incumbent rotating presidency,  
in-coming presidency, Spain.  
 
 
and the Commission. 
Swedish Environment 
Minister, 
Spanish Environment 
Minister, 
 
Stavros Dimas plus 250 
                                                          
7 PROTOCOL ON THE EXERCISE OF SHARED COMPETENCE -  
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be 
annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
Sole Article With reference to Article 2 A of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on shared 
competence, when the  Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only 
covers those elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area. 
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Supported by 
 
 
 
 
With National governments 
 
 
General-Secretariat of the Council of 
Ministers 
 
EP delegation 
 
Full participants in negotiations   
Commission officials 
Source: Various 
 
Increasing securitisation of the issue of climate change and the blurring of 
the competences of the EU’s institutions 
The challenges posed by climate change were elevated to the plane of high 
politics in the 1990s primarily because of the high level representation of the 
US in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, followed by their equally high 
level opposition to its ratification and implementation (van Shaik and van 
Hecke, 2008:11) Since the early 2000s issues of energy security and the linkage 
of concerns about the destabilising impact of the consequences of climate 
change in a number of regions, particularly in the developing world, have 
become important external drivers in global climate change politics. For the EU 
developing its external face the traditional tools and weapons of foreign policy 
are not available. The EU has and continues to use ‘soft power’ as the basis of 
its external relations. 
 
The rhetoric of climate change debate has however begun to use the rhetoric of 
the debates surrounding conflict, identifying dangers potentially extending to 
regional and global conflict. 8
 
 The European Security Strategy produced by 
Solana in 2003 acknowledged that most of the conflicts of recent decades have 
been within states but that “Competition for natural resources ...will be 
aggravated by global warming ...(and) is likely to create further turbulence and 
migratory movements in various regions”. (Solana 20003:5).  In presenting the 
Climate Change and International Security paper of 2008 Javier Solana issued a 
stark warning that “Climate change is best viewed as a multiplier threat which 
exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability” (High Representative and 
Commission, 2008:2). As such it is deemed to be in the interests of the EU to 
address the security implications of climate change with measures drawing on 
all the tools and weapons available to the EU at EU level, in bilateral relations 
and at the multilateral level.  
                                                          
8 “….as the scientific evidence accumulates it is clear that the fight against climate change is much more than a 
battle. It is a world war that will last for many years…”  
Stavros Dimas, Environment Commissioner, 2007 
“…today being a credible foreign minister means being serious about climate change..” Margaret Beckett, 2007, 
then UK Foreign Minister 
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The Lisbon Treaty has arguably emphasised the distinction between what is 
regarded as within the remit of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the 
role of the Commission, European Parliament and European Council in these 
issues. The attention is given to external action rather than as in the past to 
external relations (ie trade and development) and foreign and security policy. 
But as the boundaries between what is traditional military strategic policy and 
issues such as climate change and others including financial regulation, border 
and migration control and international justice are blurring and have gained in 
prominence globally, the role of the Commission President has been broadened. 
The result is that the external dimension of internal climate change policy and 
the issue of where climate change policy should reside within the institutional 
structures of the EU are more complicated. The potential for turf fighting 
between the institutions appears to have increased and the opportunity for more 
radical and innovative approaches to meet the challenges that it presents 
decreased.  
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Impact of Institutional and organisational change post Lisbon 
 
The Commission is the institution which has the responsibility to ensure that 
internal climate change policy is formulated on the basis of the best available 
scientific evidence. It is in the development of the EU’s internal actions on 
climate change that the Commission is most influential as it is these actions 
which are then exported to the international arena. Oversight of regulatory 
measures agreed by the member states in an international agreement, are not 
within the remit of the Commission. But once adopted as policy the 
responsibility of the Commission is to ensure that international commitments 
are implemented within the EU. Internal policy and measures to comply with 
international climate change commitments are inextricably linked. The national 
domestic climate change policies and the EU’s mechanisms for harmonisation 
of these policies exert a direct influence on the position of the EU in global 
climate change politics. What is implemented to meet external commitments is 
not separate from internal climate change policy, but becomes a pillar of that 
policy.  
 
Post the Lisbon Treaty those areas of shared competence which have 
traditionally been exercised by the Commission will continue. But this is a 
somewhat vague notion with regard to the ‘traditional’ input of the institutions. 
The institutional frameworks which have been put into place as a result of the 
Lisbon Treaty are directed to the external face of the EU particularly the 
development of mechanisms for foreign and security policy which remain the 
subject of exclusive competence and intergovernmental action. It is argued in 
this paper that instead of simplifying the notion of an external face for the EU 
the Treaty has made the situation more complex and increased the difficulties 
for Barroso as President of the Commission to influence the direction of climate 
change policy.  What the Lisbon Treaty changes have done is to emphasise the 
importance of collaboration between the institutions of the EU and the 
individuals who are in post as Presidents of those institutions. (cf  Figures 1 and 
2).   
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Figure 1 The Institutional Triangle – Pre-Lisbon 
 
The institutional triangle
Pre – Lisbon Treaty
The Council of 
Ministers
Rotating presidency, 
held by a national government
for six months
European Commission
President in post for 5 year
renewable terms
European Parliament
President chosen by MEPs, 
in post for 2⅟₂ years
European 
Council,
President, 
HoG/S
holding rotating
Presidency
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Figure 2 The Institutional Quadrangle – Post Lisbon 
 
Four institutions plus the rotating presidency makes FIVE? 
 
The institutional ‘quadrilateral’ -
Post Lisbon Treaty
European 
Council
European
Commission
Council of Ministers
Rotating 
national presidency
TRIO 2011-2012 
Hungary
Poland
Denmark
European 
Parliament,
Jerzy Buzek, EPP, 
President - In post for 2⅟₂
years
Herman von Rompuy,
President  - In post for 
2⅟₂ years, renewable 
once.
‘Foreign Minister’,
Baroness Catherine Ashton
Jose Manuel Barroso,
President  - In post for 5 
years, renewable 
Too Many 
Cooks!
 
Arguably by conferring legal status as an institution of the European Union on 
the European Council (the Heads of State and Government of the Member 
States of the EU) prominence has been given to the national leaders in the EU’s 
decision-making process at the expense of the power of the Council of 
Ministers. A new post of President of the European Council (PotEC) (Article 15 
(5) TEU) was created by the Lisbon Treaty in addition to an enhanced post for 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HRFSP). The first incumbent of the post of PotEC appointed in 2010 was the 
former Belgian Prime Minister Herman von Rompuy, a controversial 
appointment, as was that of Baroness Catherine Ashton to the post of HRFSP. 
The legislative power and role of the Council of Ministers was also been subject 
to change as the powers of the European Parliament have been reinforced 
through the increase of the areas to which the co-decision procedures apply.  
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The creation of the post of PotEC was contested but the pre-existing procedures 
which had been adopted by the national leaders for the European Council were 
subject to significant pressures following the 2004/07 enlargement. Practices 
had evolved over time for the president of the country holding the rotating 
presidency. Amongst the most time consuming was the practice of contacting 
and possible visits from the HoG/HoS of the incumbent presidency to the 
national capitals prior to major European Council summits to acheive prior 
agreement. In an EU of 27 states this had become particularly difficult for 
national leaders of the larger states or for all states during presidencies which 
occurred at the same time as national elections were held. To have an individual 
as a permanent PotEC was seen as a way of achieving efficiency and to expedite 
the consensus building process amongst the national governments. 
Equally the role of mediator and conciliator amongst the national interests did 
not always sit comfortably with that of a national leader when national interests 
proved to be controversial at the time of the rotating presidency. For example 
for the UK holding the rotating presidency, and therefore the UK prime minister 
acting as the president of the European Council, when budgetary or agricultural 
matters 9
The individual appointed to the PotEC post is responsible for:- 
 were on the EU’s political agenda.  
• Preparing the meetings of the European Council 
• Conducting the debates of the European Council 
• Drawing conclusions following meetings 
• Following up on these conclusions 
• Representing the EU in external relations at his/her level  
Specifically the President of the European Council “... shall ensure the 
preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in co-operation 
with the President of the Commission and on the basis of the work of the 
General Affairs Council (Article 15 TEU (6b). The General Affairs Council 
...shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council in 
liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission “ 
(Article 16 (6) TEU).  
The European Council does not exercise a legislative function but continues to 
provide the general political directions and priorities for the Union (a minor 
amendment of the Treaty of Nice where the work of the European Council is 
described as providing the necessary impetus for the development of the Union, 
                                                          
9 Both matters are frequently the subject of much controversy in the somewhat Euro-sceptic UK 
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defining the general political guidelines for action). The decisions of the 
European Council are made on the basis of consensus and this practice was not 
altered by the Lisbon Treaty. But as an institution of the EU the European 
Council has become bound by all the Treaty references to the institutions 
including the requirements to :- 
• Respect subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 TEU). 
• Give equal attention to all citizens (Article 9 TEU) 
• Give citizens and their representative associations the opportunity to  
exchange their views on union action (Article 11 TEU) 
• Keep national parliaments informed (Article 12 TEU) 
• Practise mutual sincere co-operation (Article 13 TEU) 
• Conduct its work as openly as possible (Article 15 TFEU) 
• Respect the rules regarding the processing of personal data (Article 16 
TFEU). 
The European Council, as a formally recognised institution of the EU, is now 
subject to the supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
At the same time as the posts of PotEC and HRCFSP were established and 
enhanced the system of rotation of the presidency of the Council of Ministers by 
a national government for six monthly periods was maintained. The Heads of 
State and Government of the Member States continue to exercise a presidency 
role and seek to use the six monthly presidency to gain increased influence on 
the EU’s decision making process and the presidency to enhance their profile 
domestically (the response of the Hungarian government during the presidency, 
January-June 2011, to the reaction of the rest of the EU to the introduction of 
their national media law). Arguably by distancing the role of the rotating 
presidency from the high level position  on behalf of the EU the result has been 
to increase the opportunity for the rotating presidency to act as ‘broker’ of deals 
on legislation, thus undermining the role of the Commission. 
Hannay highlighted the damage done by ‘turf fighting’ in the EU criticising the 
manner in which the EU has turned ‘...turf fighting into an art form. In no sector 
more damaging than in the formulation and implementation of the Union’s 
external policies ...turf fighting between the different institutions, between the 
Council, the Commission and the Parliament...within each of these institutions 
and most extensively and most damagingly within the Commission.’ (Hannay 
2010)  
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Whilst it is evident that a number of factors do constrain the leadership provided 
by the President of the Commission to the EU as a whole they do not undermine 
the more nuanced extent of influence the Commission President is able to exert. 
In turn this will have an impact on the extent of ‘turf fighting’ which takes 
place. Arguably if there is a ‘policy space’ over which there is little or no 
competition an individual or institution is able to occupy that space and increase 
their influence. Barroso assumed greater control of the internal climate change 
policy agenda during his first presidency following increased concerns amongst 
the national governments about energy policy and linkage of energy security 
and climate change. As a result the Commission was mandated to provide a 
strategy which would enable the EU to reconcile the goals of climate change 
and energy security. The strategy was introduced in January 2008 and accepted 
by the EP and the Council of Ministers in December 2008 and entered into the 
environmental acquis in June 2009.   
 
Barroso commented in late 2008 following the adoption of the EU’s package of 
climate and energy measures, ‘...we would have preferred our initial proposals. 
But the suggestion that this is a watered down ambition is non-sense. We had to 
accept changes. That’s the price to pay for unity in the end and it’s a fair price’. 
(Grice 2008) Although the package of measures was not as radical as original 
proposals Barroso was able to achieve consensus on the package of measures 
and this demonstrated his own greater ability to influence the approach of the 
EU in the preparations for the the global policy negotiations which were to be 
held in Copenhagen in 2009. He has continued to regard the issue of climate 
change as a policy arena in which he is able to exert influence. But he has not 
used that influence to push innovative policy developments during his second 
Presidency, rather he is using the changes brought about by the entry into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty to enhance the role of the Commission Presidency.  
 
The institutional changes post Lisbon have the potential to increase the 
possibilities of more turf fighting amongst the institutions and to further 
constrain the actions of the Commission and its President. The EU now has two 
institutions (the European Council and the Commission) whose Presidents have 
the role of seeking to achieve and facilitate consensus amongst the national 
governments and represent the EU in external climate change negotiations – ie 
the European Council and the Commission. The Council of Ministers remains 
as a rotating presidency amongst the national governments. Although no longer   
representing the EU in external affairs the national leaders during the rotating 
presidencies continue to seek prominence at these times. The role of external 
representation for the EU is now the responsibility of the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy (HRCFSP).    According to Article 17 
the Commission is to ensure the Union’s external representation apart from in 
the areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy. There is however an 
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increasing securitisation of the climate change agenda which blurs the relative 
competences of the institutions for external action. 
The roles of the PotEC and the HRCFSP have been outlined in a very general 
manner in the Treaty Article 15. A‘vagueness’ to the role which has been seen 
as ‘flexibility’ and an opportunity to shape the post by the first incumbent, Von 
Rompuy. Controversy surrounded the development of the role of the PotEC. 
Questions were raised about whether the appointee be a ‘Chair’ or a ‘President’. 
Kaczynski et al conclude that Von Rompuy has taken an intermediate approach 
highlighting the political effects of globalization and their impacts on the EU, 
looking for his own role on the diplomatic scene, in particular at summit 
meetings and attempting to spur the Members States into discussing the EU’s 
relationship with the major global players, for example with US President 
Barack Obama. (Kaczynski et al, 2010:141/142). 
November 20th 2010 
“We, the leaders of the European Union and the United States, met today in 
Lisbon to reaffirm our close partnership” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Von Rompuy  Barack Obama   Jose Manuel Barroso 
Thinks - OK now that’s over whose hand do 
I shake first? 
 I know I’ll wave at the camera instead! 
Sorted!!!!! Phew  
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Further adding to the complexity is the role assigned to the HRCFSP who is 
also a Vice-President of the Commission.  The post crosses institutional 
frameworks. It combines the role of High Representative for CFSP, which was 
held when it was first introduced by Javier Solana (1999-2009), with that of 
Vice President of the Commission responsible for external relations and the role 
which was performed by the Foreign Minister of the rotating presidency, which 
included chairing the Foreign Affairs Council. The Foreign Ministers of the 
Member States pre-Lisbon were members of the European Council. However 
following the Lisbon Treaty this will no longer be the case but the HRCFSP will 
be a member of the European Council but not with the same standing as the 
Commission President, who is a full member of the European Council. Other 
responsibilities for the HRCFSP include the chairing of agencies various 
agencies including the European Defence Agency.  
Amongst one of the more controversial issues for the HRCFSP has been the 
development of the European External Action Service (EEAS), Article 27 TEU. 
The objective of the EEAS is to support the HR and to represent the EU 
overseas bringing greater coherence to the Commission’s management of the 
external actions of the EU as it draws on expertise from within the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers. The Treaty provision stated that the EEAS would 
work in co-operation with the diplomatic services of the Member States and 
comprise officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of 
the Council and the Commission with staff seconded from the national 
diplomatic services of the Member States. The EEAS was to be established by 
the Council on a proposal from the HR after consultation with the European 
Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission. Although establishing 
the EEAS was an important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty the details of the 
structure and functioning of the service were left to be determined by the 
European Council acting on the basis of unanimity once the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force.  
In the event the EEAS did not come into place until early 2011. Deep divisions 
emerged between the European Parliament and the HRCFSP during the summer 
of 2010 with regard to the budget for the EEAS. The personnel for the Service 
were drawn from units the Commission, the Secretariat of the Council and 
seconded officials from the national governments. In addition to those officials 
of the Service based in Brussels the 130 delegations maintained worldwide 
brought the number of personnel in the Service to approximately 3,720 from 
within the Commission and the Council Secretariat plus a further third from the 
diplomatic services of the member states. 
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Barroro II  Commission and climate change? 
How has Barroso reacted in the first period of his second presidency? What type 
of leader is he proving to be? Overall the style of leadership of Barroso appears 
increasingly presidential, taking the opportunities to accrue more power for the 
position of the Commission President. Barroso is not a visionary or strategic 
innovator pushing new climate change strategies and policies forward. Partly 
this may be explained by divisions which are evident between the Member 
States of the EU and that facilitating consensus is difficult. Also two issues have 
dominated 2010 and early 2011 and affected his approach. The first the 
problematic economic situation which the eurozone states, indeed all the EU, 
states are facing in the light of the global economic crisis. Secondly Barroso has 
shown an increased interest in developing his own role in external relations. 
Partly this may be a reaction to the creation of another potential ‘power base’ 
within the domain of the Commission, one which is dealing directly with 
external action. The HR is responsible for the management of CFSP (Article 18 
TEU) with the President of the European Council who represents the EU on 
issues concerning CFSP. The HR is also a Vice-President of the Commission 
responsible for ensuring the coherence of the EU’s external action with the 
Commission President who is responsible for the EU’s external representation 
over non-CFSP issues (Article 17 TEU).  
At the beginning of his first presidency of the Commission in 2004 Barroso 
declared that he would be a more hands-on president that his predecessor 
Romano Prodi had been. Certainly post 2007, following his realisation of his 
ability to exert more influence on the climate policy agenda, Barrroso began to 
live up to his assertion. Barroso as President of an enlarged EU 27 used the 
practice of forming groups or clusters of Commissioners to deal with specific 
issues which had cross sectoral dimensions. Initially in 2004 five were 
identified (the Lisbon agenda, competitiveness, external relations, anti-
discrimination and equal opportunities and communication and programming). 
These groups were not decision-making on behalf of the whole Commission but 
to provide the policy input and guidance required in a Commission of 27 
Commissioners. Climate change and energy were added to the Barroso I groups 
later in his Presidency and provided opportunities for him to exercise clearer 
leadership and a more hands on approach through his chairing of the groups. 
 
Barroso showed his commitment to the climate change agenda in making the 
changes to the structure of the European Commission during his second 
presidency. A Commissioner for Climate Action was identified and a new 
Directorate-General established (DG CLIM).  But this was not an example of 
Barroso adopting the role of a strategic innovator of policy. Rather it appeared 
to have been a measure designed to ensure that Barroso retained climate change 
and many of the external aspects of the policy within the Commission. Creating 
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a separate climate action portfolio was a controversial measure as it involved 
moving units relating to climate change from DG Enterprise and Industry (DG 
ENTR) units responsible for climate action from DG Environment (DG 
ENVIRON) and the activities relating to international negotiations on climate 
change from DG External Relations (DG RELEX).   
On April 16th 2010 the Barroso approved the creation of Groups of 
Commissioners. 10
The Group of Commissioners established to deal with external relations was to 
be chaired by Baroness Ashton, HRCFSP and Vice President of the 
Commission, (VP). It included Piebalgs (Development), Fule (Enlargement), 
Georgieva (International Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response), 
de Gucht (Trade) and Rehn (Economic and Monetary Affairs). Ashton is one of 
seven Vice-Presidents of the European Commission but de facto by virtue of her 
role as HRCFSP must be considered to be the most senior of the VPs. Barroso 
has undermined that position by making the changes to the structure of the 
Director-Generals of the Commission and removing responsibilities for climate 
change which might have come within the remit the VP for external relations.  
 The Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard led 
a group of Commissioners including Kallas (Transport), Tajani (Industry and 
Entrepeneurship) Potocnik (Environment), Damanaki (Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries), Oettinger (Energy), Hahn (Regional Policy) and Ciolos (Agriculture 
and Rural Development. The Commissioner groups were not established to take 
decisions on behalf of the Commission but to adopt a horizontal and global 
approach to specific issues with regular weekly meetings to prepare briefs for 
discussion by the whole College of Commissioners. As each group works to a 
mandate provided by Barroso then he is able to exercise considerable control 
over the deliberations of the groups. If present then the expectation is that 
Barroso will chair the group meetings instead of the lead Commissioner.  
Moving units from DG RELEX also ensured that they were not included the 
remit of the European External Action Service when it was established in 
January 2011 and subject to reporting to Baroness Ashton as the HR. Again this 
appears to have undermined the role of the HR. In her presentation to the 
European Council in September on the approach the EU should adopt to deal 
with relations with the it’s ‘strategic partners’ ie with the US, Russia, China and 
India, Ashton identified climate action as one of the areas for discussion. 
Addressing the European Council in December 2010 Ashton emphasised the 
need to ensure that the EU’s foreign and security policy should be better 
integrated with other policies such as climate action, energy, trade, and 
                                                          
10 Other groups of Commissioners were established to deal with specific subjects including Innovation, Internal 
Market, Industrial Policy, Digital Agenda, Budget, Pensions, Innovative  Financial Instruments.  
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migration. She has also linked energy security to broad development issues 
including the development of mechanisms of good governance and the potential 
of such developments to strengthen state structures.  
Following the Copenhagen Accord an International Climate Change Policy to 
reinvigorate global action on climate change was introduced by the 
Commission. In this communication a stronger role for the Commission was 
advocated on the basis that this would help to ensure that the EU speaks with 
one voice was highlighted in the Communication. The Commission highlighted 
the importance for the EU to adopt a unilateral approach to cutting greenhouse 
gas emissions by 30% if other developed countries also agreed.11
By creating the new portfolio it appeared as if there was support from Barroso 
for the newly appointed Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard 
during 2010. But agreement was difficult to achieve on the proposal to proceed 
to unilaterally move to the 30% target which Hedegaard supported arguing that 
doing so would achieve green economic growth and create jobs. Whilst some 
Member States (including the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden) 
supported such a move others including the Eastern European states led by 
Poland and Italy and Finland disagreed.  Within the Commission opposition to 
the 30% target came from the Energy Commissioner Oettinger, arguing that to 
support this target would lead to industry relocating away from the EU.  The 
result of the lack of agreement both between the national governments and 
within the Commission lead to a lack of cohesion on the part of the EU during 
the negotiations. 
 This was not 
however a new commitment. The European Council had affirmed it during the 
European Council, 10th-11th December 2009. It continued to be the approach 
taken to the climate change negotiations throughout 2010 in the preparations for 
the UN Climate Conference in Cancun (Conference of the Parties, CoP 16) 29th 
November to December 10th 2010.  In proposing mechanisms to re-invigorate 
international negotiations the strategy also included outreach activities to third 
countries and key partners stating that “...the Commission, supported by the EU 
delegations of the European External Action Service, will actively engage in...” 
these activities (Commission, 2010:5) 
 
Barroso’s attention was focussed during the preparations for the Cancun climate 
change summit, not on reconciling these differences. He appeared to put the 
emphasis on the economy and developing his own political position as President 
of the European Commission. Barroso was not present at the Cancun 
negotiations which were led by Hedegaard and Schauvliege (Flemish Minister 
                                                          
11 The proviso was that the reduction would be 30% by 2020 compared to 1990 levels if other developed 
countries committed themselves to comparable emission reductions and also that the developing countries 
contribute according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
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for Environment, Nature and Culture) representing the Belgian rotating 
Presidency. He did put forward a high profile joint statement with the Connie 
Hedegaard (Climate Action) following the Cancun Summit but overall he had 
acted in a more managerial manner with regard to direction and leadership in 
the preparations and negotiation surrounding the Cancun Summit. In February 
2011 a survey of the first year of activities of the European Commission carried 
out by Burson-Marsteller concluded that the “...Barroso-II team rated as average 
or below in its first year...”. Specifically the survey showed that Barroso had put 
his own leadership of the Commission and economic issues before that of action 
on climate change. (Burson-Marseller 2011).  
 
At the same time the external face of the EU was not represented by either Von 
Rompuy nor Baroness Ashton during the Cancun negotiations despite the views 
expressed by Baroness Ashton about the importance of climate change. 
However Barroso and Ashton were both present with President von 
Rompuy 12
Conclusions 
at EU-Russia Summit (7th December 2010) and EU-India summit 
(10th December 2010) held in Brussels. On the agenda of both these summits 
was discussion of  how tooperationalise any agreement which was the result of 
the Cancun negotiations.  
Climate change is a multi-faceted problem. The impact of climate change has 
the potential for regional conflict and is increasingly discussed in that context 
within international environmental politics. The EU has been considered to be a 
leader international climate change politics in the past by default – the US, 
Russia, China not appearing to want the role. In the recent debates in 
Copenhagen, 2009, and Cancun, 2010, there were fewer opportunities for the 
EU to exert that leadership. However as a regional organisation comprising 27 
states of the developed world the impact of action advocated by the EU cannot 
be ignored. The model of political leadership in global climate change politics 
which the EU adopts is not determined by the European Commission. Climate 
change action is an arena of shared competence for the EU. As a result the 
Commission’s role in internal EU policy-making makes it is a crucial actor in 
the development of the model of action exported by the EU to the rest of the 
world.  
                                                          
12 Von Rompuy had been criticised for not attending the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. Amongst the Wikileaks 
documents released in December 2010 was one in which von Rompuy was described as meeting with the US 
Ambassador to Belgium, Howard Gutman, and presenting an angry assessment of the Copenhagen summit as a 
“ disaster in which Europe was excluded and mistreated” further advocating a bilateral approach rather than 
multilateral international agreements on climate change with the EU approaching the US first and then China. 
On the criticism of his own absence from the summit Von Rompuy expressed the view that had he been present 
his Presidency would have been over before it began. (CNN December 11, 2010) 
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During his first term as President of the Commission the arena of climate 
change policy gained in prominence as a result of the linkage of the issue with 
that of energy security. The context for the Barroso I Commission was provided 
by the legal and constitutional constraints of the Treaty competences for action. 
At the same time the impact of enlargement increased the size of the College of 
Commissioners and the difficulties associated with renewing the Treaty on 
European Union required the Commission President to concentrate on 
mediating amongst the national governments in order to make progress on 
policy proposals. Increased support for, and increased interest in the climate 
change agenda by Barroso also reflect a recognition on his part that the 
Commission had an opportunity to be more effective in the development of this 
arena of policy. In other arenas of policy, especially those related to the 
financial and economic downturn of 2008 the Commission had less opportunity 
to find a ‘policy space’ to occupy in those areas where the national governments 
retained greater competences.  Climate change also provided an arena of action 
in which the Commission could demonstrate the effectiveness of its role as an 
institution to the citizens of the EU, 67% of whom regard climate change as a 
very serious problem (Eurobarometer 2009). 
The early period of his first presidency was characterised by pragmatism and a 
technocratic approach and this continued throughout the period until its close in 
2009. Although recognising an increased ability for influence of the climate 
change agenda Barroso did not however demonstrate assertive political 
leadership of the type which Hayward ascribes to a heroic leader, rather he 
remained closer to Hayward’s model of humdrum leadership For Kille this 
would not be a surprising development as his analysis shows that a managerial 
leadership style may move towards a mid-way strategic position but that the 
individual will not shift to the opposite pole of the visionary style of leadership.  
 
In the analysis presented in this paper the competences of the Commission were 
initially outlined. The climate change policy agenda has been strengthened as a 
result of the inclusion of a specific reference in the Lisbon Treaty. The legal 
basis for action continues as one of shared competence for action between the 
Commission and the national governments with the Commission taking a lead 
role in international negotiations. Other institutional changes included in the 
Lisbon Treaty have an impact on how the Commission and the President of the 
Commission exercise their competence and this in turn affects the extent to 
which the Commission President is able to act as a leader in the presentation of 
climate change initiatives.  
In order to initiative effective climate change policy long term innovative 
political leadership is required. The Commission has the potential to provide the 
long term innovative leadership as it is not dependent on changes of policy 
content and orientation associated with changes to the other institutions as the 
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result of national and European elections. The work of the Commission has 
become increasingly politicised as a result of successive phases of enlargement 
and increased number of actors in the EU’s policy making. The Commission in 
the role of management of the arrangements and oversight of the work of the 
EU in the context of the new institutional arrangements has become more 
complex. However the importance of the Commission as an institution able to 
act as a consensus builder between the national governments, with the EP and 
the range of stakeholders involved in climate change policy has grown as has 
the role of ensuring effective implementation of legislation is essential if the 
policy is to have impact.  
Specifically three developments have been considered in this paper:- 
1. The development of the position of permanent President for the European 
Council which includes the responsibility to mediate between the national 
governments and achieve consensus. (This was the role of the head of 
state of the rotating presidency but by including as a specific 
responsibility of the permanent President of the European Council it is 
elevated to a new prominence and as such has the potential to undermine 
the mediator role of the Commission President). 
2. The appointment of the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, responsible for the European External Action Service, 
who is also a Vice-President of the European Commission. 
3. Increased power for the President of the European Commission vis-a vis 
the rest of the Commission which has undermined the notion of the 
President as primus inter pares and Barroso to adopt a more presidential 
style during his second term as President of the Commission. 
The consequence of the Lisbon Treaty has been to increase the power of the 
President of the European Commission vis-a vis the rest of the Commission and 
eroding the notion of the President as primus inter pares. The national 
governments retain the right to elect the President of the Commission and 
nominate the Commissioners. But the EP has increased power with regard to the 
election of the Commission President and increased supervisory power over the 
choice and the work of the Commission.  
The result of the evidence to date since appears to be an increased potential for 
what Hannay described as ‘turf fighting’ as the new roles with responsibility for 
representing the external face of the EU are evolving. Further complicating the 
picture of where the direction may be found for the EU’s international climate 
change policy is the increasing securitisation of the issue and the blurring of 
what the implications of the impact of climate change may be. Does it come 
within the compass of military/security issues? Certainly it is not a 
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military/security issue in the traditional sense but the outcome of climate change 
may indeed result in conflict requiring a military/security response putting it 
into the arena of the burgeoning EU foreign and defence policy.  
 
In this evolving and new context Barroso as the President of the Commission 
has continued in a pragmatic manner in his approach to leadership of the 
Commission. His style has become more ‘presidential’ by his centralisation of 
power into the post of the Commission President and oversight of the 
development by the College of Commissioners of their individual portfolios. 
The role of the Commission President was significantly enhanced by the new 
prerogative conferred in the Lisbon Treaty for the President to have the power 
to dismiss a member of the College of Commissioners. The decision to re-
structure some of the units of the various Directorates-General of the 
Commission has ensured that aspects of the international climate change policy 
remains outside the remit of the work of the High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy although the incumbent of this post is also a Vice-
President of the Commission. Barroso’s opportunity to act in a strategic or 
innovative style to push forward radical climate change strategy has been 
constrained by the economic and financial crises of 2010/2011. Enlargement of 
the EU and the failure to make changes to the size of the College of 
Commissioners  puts more emphasis on the role of the Commission President to 
achieve consensus on decision-making.  
 
It would have been highly unlikely that Barroso would have become a more 
strategic and visionary leader of the Commission with enhanced ablity to exert 
significant influence on the outcome of the EU’s international climate change 
policy  at the beginning of his second term as Commission President. However 
the evidence to date suggests that he has been more concerned to establish the 
position of the Commission President in the new institutional structures of the 
EU. He has focussed his attention on the economic and financial problems of 
the EU and also enhanced his own representation in high level political and 
diplomatic negotiations potentially undermining the longer term objectives and 
support for climate change action.  The climate change agenda is one which 
requires a great deal of co-operation and collaboration across many policy areas 
if an effective and proactive response is to come from the EU in global climate 
change politics.  
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